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Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explain people’s support for development aid. While both attributes like 
philanthropy and solidaristic value orientations have been broadly analyzed by scholarship, this paper uses 
these conceptual bases in answering what shapes people’s attitudes towards development aid (Bekkers 
2007; Arts & Gelissen 2001). Ignoring whether people are actually willing to give for development aid 
projects, or whether it is rather the state that supports developing countries by means of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), I focus solely on people’s conviction that the richer countries should 
redistribute to the poorer countries. Hence, this research implies a focus on individual as well as contextual 
predictors that shape people’s opinion concerning giving to less developed countries.  
In particular, the analysis tests whether domestic income inequality spurs the importance that people 
attach to development aid. It has been found that domestic levels of income inequality are perceived by 
citizens and lead to various reactions within societies. This article aims to contribute to the literature that 
deals with the societal impacts of inequality.  
Theoretical implications suggest that high domestic income inequality diminishes support for 
development aid: First, it is suggested that support for both international and domestic redistribution rest 
upon solidaristic and egalitarian ideals. Yet, it has been shown that such values are negatively affected by 
inequality. Second, Noël & Thérien (2002) proposed that support for international redistribution is only 
approved if the domestic economic situation allows for it.  
Based on cross-sectional Eurobarometer survey over almost two decades, the relationship between 
national inequality and people’s preferences regarding international development assistance will be 
investigated.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, I will introduce the theoretical implications and 
derived hypotheses. In a methodological section, I will describe the data and research design applied in this 
paper. The last two chapters are devoted to the analysis’ results and interpretation before I conclude with 
final remarks and limitations of the analysis. 
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Theoretical framework & hypotheses 
This paper explains how support for development aid comes about. Support for development aid is 
framed as a rather general concept: the concern of this analysis is not whether one is personally willing or 
able to donate for international development aid, or whether one approves the government’s provision of 
ODA, but focuses rather on people’s opinion and conviction that development aid is a pivotal concern in 
richer societies. So it does not refer to individual responsibility, as both the state as well as the individual 
might be the actors of reference.  
It is suggested that support for development aid is not solely shaped by individual attributes like 
religious affiliation and socioeconomic characteristics, but certainly also by other components. Yet, while 
also micro predictors are taken into account, the analysis’ main focus is on the question how importance 
attached to development aid is shaped through contextual variables. In particular, the analysis deals with 
the effects of a country’s level of income inequality on people’s opinion about development aid which is 
broadly stressed within the next sections. Afterwards, I will briefly refer to other macro and micro level 
factors that might shape people’s approval of development aid. 
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Income inequality and support for development aid 
On a micro level, individual morals entailing whether one approves development aid are certainly 
shaped by one’s own living condition, by the morals conveyed within the family or environment one grew 
up with and religious orientations. Ignoring sociological and economic concepts that assume a mere self-
interested benefit maximizing individual, this argument rests partly on the paradigm of new 
institutionalism. Understood as a social norm, solidarity is a concept deeply rooted in societal context as 
well as familial socialization and prone to be shaped by economic, social and various other conditions (Nee 
& Ingram 1998). Thus, people have feelings of sympathy and compassion for others, certainly for those 
having less than oneself. Such feelings might rest upon socialization, living context as well as approval by 
others. In a recent paper, Henson and Lindstrom (2012) show that such micro-level morals affect people’s 
attitudes towards developmentaid: based on British data, their study revealed that self-interest is positively 
related to support for cuts in development aid, while the effect was negative regarding moral duty. 
However, such orientations might not only be shaped through micro level attributes and individual 
experiences but also by macro contexts. For example, whether and how development aid is dealt with 
within a giving country’s media can shape people’s support for international redistribution. Further, a 
country’s dominant ideology, value orientations and political positioning regarding international 
development might shape whether a society as whole approves it.  
This paper supposes that also the level of societal income inequality spurs the approval for 
development aid. During the last decades, many advanced democracies have experienced a rise in 
inequality (OECD 2011; 2008). In conjunction with this development, scholars have identified undesirable 
societal developments, impacts within the political sphere as well as changes in attitudes and norms. It has 
been found that inequality spurs societal trust and satisfaction with current democracy, trust in politicians 
and governments (Schäfer 2010; Uslaner & Brown 2005; Uslaner 2002). In line with the findings of rising 
political dissatisfaction, inequality has been identified to diminish overall turnout in national elections 
(Horn, 2011).  
In fact, scholars also found that inequality alters norms and values in the long-run. Societies that 
experience high levels of income inequality seem to modestly attach less importance to values that foster 
societal cohesion like tolerance. At the same time, individualist values like work ethic become more 
pronounced (Lindbeck & Nyberg 2006; Lindbeck, Nyberg & Weibull 1999; Corneo 2011). These findings 
suggest that values regarding societal cohesion and cooperation are shaped by broad socioeconomic 
developments like the domestic level of inequality.  
Analyzing people’s solidarity across countries, Arts & Gelissen (2001) found that people in the 
Mediterranean countries and social-democratic welfare states show significantly higher solidaristic value 
orientations compared to other citizens. With the objective to explain the size of Official Development 
Assistance, some scholars argued that underlying societal values like solidarity lead to a societal consensus 
of commitment – both on the national and the international level. Hence, the size of governmental 
development aid reflects the magnitude of redistribution within a country, resulting in a positive correlation 
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betweenspending for national social policies and international redistribution (Lumsdaine 1993; Stokke 
1989). Olav Stokke (1989) explains governmental development aid grounded on the idea of humane 
internationalism: living in well-off countries brings about a moral obligation to help exposure countries. 
For example in Sweden and Norway, the state perceives development assistance as a responsibility due to 
an underlying ideology of helping the disadvantaged (ibid, 278). Further, the size of a country’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) seems to be related to social policy institutions: with reference to Esping-
Andersen’s welfare state classification, it has been found that social democratic states give the most, 
followed by conservative states while liberal states give the least (Noël & Thérien 1995).  
Though, what does that say about the association between national inequality and people’s approval of 
international redistribution? Assuming first, that public support for international giving of people living in 
affluent countries rests upon fundamental values like solidarity and that second, a country’s income 
inequality negatively spurs societal norms, it can be expected that support for development aid is lower in 
countries where income inequality is high.  
Yet, it is arguable whether solidarity is a universal concept. Solidarity and sympathy might rest upon 
closeness and homogeneity within social groups. For example, akin members of a group might show more 
solidarity among each other due to their commonalities and similarities in living situation. Consideration 
for fellow citizens might be also higher the closer they live by, while solidarity and concernment towards 
strangers and people living far away is given to somewhat lesser extent. Thus, it is questionable whether 
solidarity holds as a theoretical argument that explains support for international redistribution in light of 
increasing domestic inequality.  
However, the relationship between domestic inequality and people’s support for development aid can 
be also examined from a different angle. The Richard-Meltzer-theorem predicts a higher demand for 
redistribution the higher a country’s actual level of inequality (Meltzer & Richard 1981). Although this 
approach has not yet found clear empirical confirmation, it is still the initial point in explaining domestic 
redistributive demands (Kenworthy & McCall 2008; Lübker 2007; Finseraas 2009; Tóth & Keller 2011). 
In their article “Public Opinion and Global Justice”, Noël and Thérien (2002) suppose a negative 
equilibrium between support for domestic redistribution and international giving which rests upon domestic 
levels of inequality. How is this relationship explained? In contrast to the above described argument that 
support for international as well as domestic redistribution are positively correlated as they both reflect 
deep-rooted value orientations, Noël and Thérien propose that public opinions are not only shaped by 
underlying stable value dimensions, but also sensitive to actual social, economic and political conditions 
within a given state. Hence, people should be also sensitive to within country inequality. Their argument is 
based on the following mechanism: if income inequality is low, people will be satisfied with the given level 
of redistribution within their country rather than demanding more. In contrast, they favour more 
international redistribution. To sum up, the authors propose a negative relationship between people’s 
demand for domestic and international redistribution, which is rooted in a positive relationship of domestic 
income inequality and demand for domestic redistribution, and a negative relationship between income 
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inequality and international redistribution. In their own empirical assessment of the proposed relationship 
they found indeed a negative correlation of people’s support for domestic redistribution and international 
redistribution. Yet, their results merely rest upon a correlation of aggregated cross-country data of ten 
European countries in 1995 without controlling for confounding variables like GDP.  
Thus, the analysis presented in this article enhances Noël and Thérien approach. In light of high 
inequality, support for international redistribution should be low, while large domestic redistribution should 
lead to the fact that people are satisfied with it and hence demand more international giving. Asking British 
citizens about their government spending priorities, it was indeed found that global poverty is an important 
issue among international problems, but that it is less a concern in comparison to national issues (DFID 
2009). Also based on British data, Henson and Lindstrom (2012) found that agreement to the statement 
priority should be given to poverty alleviation at home to be significantly positively related to approval of 
cuts in development aid.  
Due to a methodological concern, this paper concentrates solely on the second part of the mechanism 
proposed by Noël and Thérien, namely the relationship between inequality and attitudes toward 
international redistribution. It is suggested that people are more sensitivetowards net income inequality 
rather than towards gross inequality as this refers to the resources that are on a household’s disposal. 
Therefore, the income inequality indicator that is used within this analysis is net income inequality i.e. after 
tax deductions and benefits. Yet, it is problematic to include both net inequality and redistribution in the 
analysis as they are highly negatively correlated (for the time period and set of countries used in this 
analysis it was -0.62). Hence, the investigation of the triangular relation between inequality, demand for 
domestic redistribution and international redistribution remains a task for prospective research.  
The following hypothesis concerning the relationship between inequality and approval of development 
aid will be tested:  
H1: The higher the domestic level of inequality, the lower the support for international redistribution. 
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The effect of inequality and individual income 
While the prior sections dealt with the relationship of income inequality on opinions about 
international giving, it will be stressed whether economic differences within a given society affect the 
approval of development aid. It is particularly of interest whether the economic situation shapes whether 
one supports or refuses international redistribution. 
First, I suppose that the approval of international solidarity increases by income. People who do not 
earn a lot might have less comprehension that their government supports people abroad, while people living 
within the country deserve and need more financial support as well. In a recent study, Chong and Gradstein 
(2006) also found that people tend to be more in favour of higher public development aid the higher their 
income. 
Further, it is suggested that this effect should be more pronounced under conditions of high inequality, 
as people with low incomes in highly unequal societies might perceive international redistribution as unfair 
while they are the most affected by income inequalities. 
H2: The higher the individual income, the greater the support for development aid. 
H3: Domestic inequality diminishes the support for development aid among low-income earners. 
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Official Development Assistance 
The first two explanatory factors for support of development aid referred to the contextual and 
individual economic situation. Yet, it can be also tested whether the actual level of a state’s Official 
Development Assistance affects people’s support for it. The research design chosen within this article does 
not allow for a causal interpretation of this relationship: a positive relationship between the actual level of a 
nation’s development assistance and public approval of it is proposed. No causal claim can be made how 
this relationship comes about. It might be the case that governments with high levels of ODA also actively 
try to persuade the population by spreading information and educating the population about it. People take 
notice of the problems and needs of the developing countries which might thereby increase their support for 
development aid. On the other hand, high ODA can be a reflection of people’s preferences: people elect 
governments that consider ODA as a pivotal issue or that pursue egalitarian policies in general. Yet, it has 
been found that people are rather uninformed about their countries development assistance activities and 
strategies. Most people do not know whether their own state gives a lot or not relative to other 
governments, and whether government’s development assistance rises or declines (Smillie 1999). Further, 
the definition of development aid may remain unclear as people may confound it with humanitarian help 
(Hudson & van Heerde-Hudson 2012). In a case study based on five countries, Otter (2003) found weak 
evidence for the link between ODA size and people’s support of it. In four countries, ODA size was not 
affected by changes in societal support for development assistance. Only for Denmark, a positive 
association was found which the author explained with reference to civil society involvement for global 
poverty. This is in line with Olsen’s (2001) finding that public support for development assistance and aid 
policy are not connected. Yet, he also found a positive link in case of humanitarian emergencies that are 
accompanied by high media coverage.  
H4: The higher a government’s Official Development Assistance, the higher the people’s support for 
development aid within this country. 
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Data and estimation procedure 
The analysis is based on cross-sectional unbalanced panel data of the Eurobarometer survey. The 
Eurobarometer surveys opinion of citizens within all European Union member states concerning various 
issues related to European citizenship1. Questions about international development aid are included in the 
years 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 20022. In total, the analysis focuses on sixteen countries. For 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Great Britain and 
Greece, data from all seven waves were available. Data from Spain and Portugal are available for all waves 
except for the first wave in 1983. Norway only participated in 1991 and 1995 and citizens from Finland, 
Sweden and Austria contributed from 1995 onwards3. The German sample of 1983 and 1987 refers to West 
Germany only; for the post-1990 waves, the survey sample takes reunited Germany into account. The 
overall sample consists of 101 307 respondents. 
 
Table 1. Description of sample and number of respondents by country 
Country  Waves  Respondents  Percent  
France  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,059  6.97  
Belgium  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,214  7.12  
Netherlands  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,150  7.06  
Germany  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  12,379  12.22  
Italy  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,258  7.16  
Luxembourg  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  3,622  3.58  
Denmark  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,014  6.92  
Ireland  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,018  6.93  
Great Britain  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  9,361  9.24  
Greece  1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  7,023  6.93  
Spain  1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  6,016  5.94  
Portugal  1987, 1991, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  5,943  5.87  
Norway  1991, 1995  1,954  1.93  
Finland  1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  4,100  4.05  
Sweden  1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  3,990  3.94  
Austria  1995, 1996, 1998, 2002  4,206  4.15  
  101,307  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 More information about the Eurobarometer survey is available on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm   
2 Exact datasets: Eurobarometer 20: Aid to Developing Nations, October 1983  
Eurobarometer 28: Relations with Third World Countries and Energy Problems, November 1987  
Eurobarometer 36: Regional Identity, and Perceptions of the Third World, October/November 1991  
Eurobarometer 44.1: Education and Training Throughout Life, and the Common European Currency, 
November/December 1995  
Eurobarometer 46.0: Personal Health, Energy, Development Aid, and the Common European Currency, 
October/November 1996  
Eurobarometer 50.1: Information Society Services, Food Quality, the Family, and Aid to Development, 
November/December 1998  
Eurobarometer 58.2: Health and Developing Countries, October/December 2002 
3 Eurobarometer surveys 62.2 (2004), 71.2 (2009), 73.5 (2010) and 76.1 (2011) deal with development aid, but do not 
include information about the respondents income. Therefore, these waves are not included in the analysis, but will be 
shown in the descriptive data analysis.   
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Dependent variable 
Approval of development aid is measured by one single question. This is certainly not ideal, but no 
other items that could have served to construct a composite variable were available in all waves, as the 
design and structure of the questionnaire varied. Furthermore, data reliability is constrained by the fact that 
the questionnaire structure and topics included varied between waves. Although developing countries was 
always one of the main topics within the surveys considered, they also dealt with various other topics like 
for example education in 1995 or health in 2002. It cannot be ruled out that this affects reliability between 
waves: the other topics discussed within the questionnaire might shape the reactions regarding the 
development aid question. Also the question wording slightly changed between waves. In the four first 
waves (1983, 1987, 1991 and 1995), it is based on the following item that was asked among a set of other 
items: 
  
“Here is a list of problems that people of our country are more or less interested in. Could you please 
tell me for each one whether you personallyconsider it as a very important problem, quite important, 
not very important, or not at all important?  
Helping poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia etc.” 
 
Answering categories were very important, important, little importance and not important at all4. For 
the following waves (1996, 1998 and 2002), public support for development aid is measured as one stand 
alone question: 
 
“In your opinion, is it very important, important, not very important or not at all important to help the 
people in poor countries in Africa, South America, Asia, etc. to develop?” 
 
Answering categories resembled those of the earlier question: Very important, important, not very 
important and not at all important5. The range of the variable was reversed, so that a higher figure indicates 
more support for development aid. Strictly speaking, this variable is ordinally scaled. Yet, in order to make 
use of linear estimation techniques, it is treated as a continuous variable.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the variable by country for pooled data. In most countries the modus 
is coding 3 (quite) important, followed by the highest answering option very important. Greece and Spain 
differ, as most respondents indicated that they find development aid very important. However, the 
country’s distribution’s resemble each other in their left-skewed distributions. Austria, Belgium, France 
and Great Britain and Norway are the countries that have the highest proportion of respondents attaching 
low or no importance at all to development aid. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The exact wording of the third answering option varied also between waves: in 1987, “little importance” is 
substituted by “fairly important”; in 1991 and 1995 it was “not very important”.   
5 In 2002, the second answering category was not “important”, but “fairly important”.   
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Figure 1. Distribution of variable ‘Importance of development aid’ by country  
(Range: 1: not at all important – 4: very important) 
	  
Note: Pooled data; Source: Eurobarometer 
 
Country differences of importance given to development aid by citizens are shown in table 2 which 
includes country means of pooled data. All means are very high, indicating that citizens of all countries are 
convinced that development aid is something pivotal. Yet, one needs to keep in mind that such items might 
be upwardly biased due to social desirability. The Mediterranean countries show high approval of 
development aid. Interestingly, people living in Spain and Greece, those two countries that contribute 
particularly little to ODA, express the greatest importance to development aid. In the middle group are the 
Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, those with the highest share in ODA. The lowest value 
attached to development aid is indicated by people living in middle and West Europe. 
 
Table 2. Country mean of the dependent variable ‘Importance of development aid’ 
Country Mean Standard Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Spain  3.40 0.01 3.38 3.41 
Greece  3.27 0.01 3.25 3.29 
Luxembourg  3.23 0.01 3.22 3.27 
Italy  3.22 0.01 3.20 3.24 
Income Inequality and Support for Development Aid  
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Sweden  3.22 0.01 3.19 3.24 
Portugal  3.21 0.01 3.20 3.23 
Ireland  3.18 0.01 3.16 3.20 
Denmark  3.17 0.01 3.15 3.19 
Netherlands  3.14 0.01 3.13 3.16 
Finland  3.08 0.01 3.06 3.11 
Germany  3.07 0.01 3.07 3.09 
Great Britain  3.06 0.01 3.04 3.08 
Norway  2.98 0.01 2.94 3.02 
France  2.95 0.01 2.93 2.97 
Austria  2.93 0.01 2.90 2.95 
Belgium  2.82 0.01 2.80 2.85 
Note: Range: 1 not at all important - 4 very important, ordered by mean  
 
Figure 2 shows country means by wave. In contrast to the analysis data, country means of recent 
waves have been added6. These were not integrated in the analysis as these survey waves lacked 
information on individual income. The general trend was an increase in approval of development aid, 
particularly at the turn of the millennium. This rise may be caused by the setup of the millennium goals and 
their high media coverage. As the question set up already changed between 1995 and 1996, this increase 
cannot be attributed to changes in the survey design. Another interesting observation is that citizen’s 
approval clearly reflects the country’s economic development: While Greece and Spain were the  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Over time development of country means of variable ‘Importance of development 
aid’   
(Range: 1: not at all important – 4: very important) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6 2004: Eurobarometer 62.2, November-December 2004  
2009: Eurobarometer 71.2, May-June 2009  
2010: Eurobarometer 73.5, June 2010  
2011: Eurobarometer 76.1, September 2011  
Question wording in 2004 identical to 2002; Question wording in 2009, 2010 and 2011: “In your opinion, is it very 
important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to help people in developing countries?”. In 
2011, a reference to European engagement with the following introductory sentence was added: “The EU provides 
development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. EU 
development aid consists of the aid provided by both the European Commission and the national Governments of the 
EU Member States.”   
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Source: Eurobarometer 
 
countries with the highest support during the 90s, they rank now among the countries with the lowest 
approval. A similar development is visible for Ireland. Year means of the dependent variable vary 
considerably from wave to wave. Yet, whether this is due to a change in question wording is doubtful as 
the means also changed considerably from one wave to the next when no changes in survey design 
occurred. The overall mean of support for international development aid dropped from 3.20 to 3.06 
between 1996 and 1998 and increased again to 3.37 in 2002. Further, this huge variation cannot be 
explained by the fact that the countries number increases successively from wave to wave. Overall year 
means for a restricted set of countries for which information was available for all waves were compared to 
year means of the countries for which information was available for each year and revealed no huge 
difference between the two. 
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Independent variables 
Within the next sections, the independent variables will be described. I will first refer to the macro 
variables before I turn to the micro predictors and control variables. Although one can expect that this set 
of advanced European democracies is a quite homogenous sample in terms of value orientations, political 
and economic context, there are significant differences both in inequality levels and provided Official 
Development Assistance. For example, the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands are among the most 
generous countries while they also show persistently low levels of domestic income inequality. Descriptive 
information about the contextual variables is included in table 4.  
The Gini is an index for the distribution of incomes. It ranges from 0 to 100 where 0 indicates a totally 
equal income distribution. Assuming that people are rather sensible to net inequality as this refers to the 
household income that people have at their disposal, this analysis is based on net Gini coefficients. Net 
Gini coefficients are based on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID, Solt 2009). As 
an enhancement of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the World Income Inequality Database 
(WIID), the SWIID provides comparable estimates for a wide range of countries and years.  
For the years and countries used within this study, Portugal had the highest Gini coefficient in 2002 
(35.87), the lowest one has been measured in Finland in 1995 (21.70). Most countries have an average Gini 
between 20 and 30. Further, most countries’ income inequality increased between the 80s and 2002. 
According to the SWIID data, only France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland were able to diminish 
their Gini between 1983 and 2002. The coefficient of Austria also decreased from 1995 onwards, the first 
wave when Austria participated in the survey considered in this analysis. The South European countries 
Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain show persistently high net Gini coefficients above 30, with sharp 
increases from 1983 and 1987 to 2002 in Italy, Spain and Portugal (+3.99, +6.15 and +5.65, respectively). 
Among the high inequality countries are also Great Britain and Ireland, although Ireland was able to 
decrease its net inequality level between 1983 and 2002 by two points. Unsurprising, the lowest net income 
inequality coefficients are found in the Northern European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of macro variables GDP, Gini and ODA 
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Country  Waves 
included  
GDP, in 1000 US 
Dollar  
Gini, range 0-100  ODA, as % of GNI  
 Mean Difference Mean Difference Mean  Difference  
France  1983-2002  19.48  14.99  26.83  -2.23  0.51  -0.19  
Belgium  1983-2002  19.32  15.48  24.72  4.00  0.42  -0.16  
Netherlands  1983-2002  20.00  15.75  25.49  -0.89  0.86  -0.10  
Germany  1983-2002  20.96  14.97  27.25  1.98  0.33  -0.21  
Italy  1983-2002  17.96  13.48  32.57  3.99  0.23  0.00  
Luxembourg  1983-2002  33.51  35.57  25.44  1.76  0.45  0.69  
Denmark  1983-2002  21.19  16.54  23.58  -3.44  0.93  0.23  
Ireland  1983-2002  15.68  21.24  32.72  -1.99  0.27  0.20  
Great Britain  1983-2002  18.58  16.26  32.61  6.75  0.30  -0.04  
Greece  1983-2002  11.03  8.67  33.31  1.28  0.17  0.06  
Spain  1987-2002  15.61  11.59  32.24  6.15  0.21  0.18  
Portugal  1987-2002  13.76  10.56  33.32  5.65  0.23  0.16  
Norway  1991-1995  21.37  3.86  23.44  0.70  1.00  -0.27  
Finland  1995-2002  20.15  6.52  22.96  3.28  0.32  0.04  
Sweden  1995-2002  22.76  5.74  22.09  0.11  0.79  0.07  
Austria  1995-2002  24.62  6.46  26.85  -1.14  0.24  -0.01  
Note: Country means are based on the waves a country participated in the survey. Difference refers to the change in the macro 
variable from the earliest wave of participation compared to the last wave.  
 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a measure for official governmental international aid 
flows and is based on OECD data. International financial flows are considered as ODA if it concerns public 
funds, it aims at development or welfare of other countries, and at least 25% of the provided sum needs to 
be a grant, rather than a loan. Yearly size of a country’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) are based 
on OECD calculations and are included as total net official development assistance in percentage of gross 
national income (GNI) in US dollars (OECD/DAC 2012).  
Official Development Assistance as percentage of a country’s gross national income varies a lot 
between countries. The Mediterranean countries gave the least, although Spain and Portugal raised their 
share significantly between 1987 and 2002 from 0.08 to 0.26 and 0.11 to 0.27, respectively. By far, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are the countries with the highest contributions. Interestingly, 
there is no clear pattern in changes: while most of the EU founding countries have decreased their ODA as 
a share of GNI between 1983 and 2002, some other countries have raised their contribution, for example 
Luxembourg whose GNI also increased significantly during the same period (+0.69 between 1983 to 2002).  
Not surprising, Gini coefficients and ODA are strongly negatively correlated (-.64) indicating that in 
countries with high levels of net inequality, contributions in terms of ODA seem to be low as well.  
Monthly household income is included based on a survey question within the Eurobarometer and 
comprises all kinds of income including wages, salaries, pensions, social insurance benefits and child 
allowances of all household members before tax and other deductions. The Eurobarometer survey provides 
12 country specific income categories that are based on country- and year adjusted income distributions. 
Hence, the income indicator is not an absolute income measure, but rather a relative one that makes it 
possible to compare overall income differences (poor compared to rich in all countries), while wealth 
differences between countries will be grasped by GDP. In 1995, the income categories in the Portuguese 
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questionnaire differed from the conventional 12 answers, but only offered a 1 to 8 range. Unfortunately, 
these observations needed to be excluded in the analysis.  
Assuming that people at the low end of the income distribution are the most affected by high income 
inequality, an interaction term is included to test whether poor people’s attitudes towards international 
development aid are more strongly spurred by the degree of inequality they experience. The interaction 
term is the product of a dummy variable for belonging to the country’s lowest monthly household income 
quartile, which is also provided by the Eurobarometer survey, and the net Gini coefficient. In addition, a 
similar interaction term is added for the highest income quartile and income inequality. 
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Control variables 
Gender is included as a dummy variable where males are coded 0 and females 1.  
Age is a continuous variable starting at age 15, the minimum age of participation. 
Political orientation is included as left-right self-placement on a scale ranging from one to ten where 
a low number indicates a left orientation.  
Education. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer dataset does not include detailed information about 
respondent’s educational degrees. Rather, one question asked about respondent’s age when leaving school. 
This variable is recoded into an ordinal scaled variable with four categories: left school at age 15 or before 
serves as a proxy for no or lower secondary education. Leaving school between the age of 16 and 19 is 
comparable to middle or high secondary education, while leaving general education when the respondent 
was 20 years or older suggests some kind of tertiary education. The fourth category includes respondents 
that were still within the educational system when participating in the survey. An obvious shortcoming of 
this education measure is that slow learners might remain longer in general education without achieving 
high educational degrees.  
As a comparative indicator for cross-country wealth, the real gross domestic product per Capita 
(GDP) in US dollar is included. It is based on the Penn World Table which provides a large data source of 
harmonized economic indicators (Heston et al. 2002). As table 4 indicates, Luxembourg has by far the 
highest mean GDP in all years the survey was conducted. Furthermore, it also has the highest growth of 
GDP per capita between 1983 and 2002, namely from 13.800 to 49.400 US dollar. The Mediterranean 
countries and Ireland are the countries with the lowest GDP during this period. 
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Estimation Strategy 
As respondents are not independent, but rather nested in countries and years, a hierarchical linear 
regression method is chosen. Respondents are clustered in country-years in order to distinguish contextual 
and individual level variance. The higher level unit country-years comprises in total 96 groups. 
Hierarchical mixed linear regression models are used that allow the country-year-groups to vary randomly 
across the intercept. All estimations are conducted with Stata 11.2 (StataCorp 2009).  
First, using an empty variance components model, it will be tested whether the assumed hierarchical 
data structure is actually observed. In a second basic model, country and year fixed effects are checked. 
Then, I will start testing the proposed hypotheses by including successively macro and micro level 
independent variables. In these models, country fixed effects are not included. In the last model, I will 
conduct a strict test of the effect of the inequality coefficient by including country fixed effects again. 
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Results 
Table 5 shows the results of the two base models. Model 01 is a simple variance-components-model 
that merely distinguishes the variance found at the individual level and at the country-year level. The intra-
class correlation indicator Rho shows that 8% of the entire variance of the dependent variable can be 
attributed to the context variable country-years. Further, the likelihood ratio test, comparing the conducted 
model to a model without group clusters, gives a statistically significant chi square value, indicating that 
country-year intercepts do indeed vary. Hence, it can be concluded that controlling for higher level 
clustering is necessary in the analysis.  
In model 02, year as well as country fixed effects are added to the analysis. The country-year variance 
indicated by rho shrinks to 0.02. Not surprising, all year coefficients are significantly positive, indicating 
that the support for development aid increased over time. Yet, this effect is not linear, but unsteady. Most 
country coefficients are positive, indicating that approval for development aid is higher in those countries 
compared to the reference country France. Quite a number of country coefficients lack significance (among 
them Great Britain, Norway, Finland and Austria). Country coefficients reflect the country means 
confirming that approval for development aid is particularly high in countries like Spain and Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Empty random intercept model and random intercept model with country and year 
fixed effects 
 Model 01 Model 02 
Reference: 1983 
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 1987 0.14 
**
 (0.05) 
 1991 0.30
***
 (0.05) 
 1995 0.21
***
 (0.05) 
 1996 0.34
***
 (0.05) 
 1998 0.19
***
 (0.05) 
 2002 0.51
***
 (0.05) 
Reference: France 
 Belgium -0.13
*
 (0.06) 
 The Netherlands 0.19
**
 (0.06) 
 Germany 0.12
*
 (0.06) 
 Italy 0.27
***
 (0.06) 
 Luxembourg 0.28
***
 (0.06) 
 Denmark 0.22
***
 (0.06) 
 Ireland 0.23
***
 (0.06) 
 Great Britain 0.11 (0.06) 
 Greece 0.32
***
 (0.06) 
 Spain 0.41
***
 (0.06) 
 Portugal 0.22
***
 (0.06) 
 Norway 0.01 (0.09) 
 Finland 0.06 (0.07) 
 Sweden 0.20
**
 (0.07) 
 Austria -0.09 (0.07) 
Constant 3.13
*** 
(0.02) 2.71
***
 (0.05) 
Log lik. -111428.47 -111357.34  
Chi2 Value 7303.99 1435.41  
P-Value 0.00 0.00  
Rho 0.08 0.02  
N (N groups) 96126 (96) 96126 (96)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* 
p < 0.05, 
** 
p < 0.01, 
*** 
p < 0.001 
 
Now, micro and macro predictors are added to model M01 (country fixed effects are not included in 
these models). Model 1 shows a mixed model with random country-year-intercepts, fixed effects for years 
and individual level predictors. Due to missing values, particularly concerning income, the sample size 
reduces drastically. Furthermore, as income categories for Portugal in 1995 are not consistent with the 
overall measure, observations from Portugal in 1995 are excluded, resulting in 95 country-year-clusters. 
 
As expected, the 12 category variable for income is significantly positive indicating that the support 
for development aid increases with the respondent’s household income. Yet, it is marginally low. 
Regarding other demographic characteristics, Model 1 reveals that women show significantly higher 
approval of development aid, a finding that confirms earlier research results (Paxton & Knack 2008). Like 
income, age does not seem to be a strong predictor for approval of development aid: the coefficient is 
significant on a 0.01 level and positive, but like income marginally low. Among the micro level predictors, 
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education spurs support for development aid the strongest: while approval of development aid increases on 
average by 0.03 units for someone who left the educational system between age 16 and 19 instead of age 15 
or younger, those who were at least 20 when finishing education show on average already 0.18 more 
support for development aid on the 1 to 4 scale. The last education category consists of respondents that are 
still in education i.e. students and pupils. Those have the highest coefficient. On average, those in the 
education system show one quarter of a unit higher approval for development aid on the 1 to 4 scale. In line 
with expectations, it can be clearly confirmed that approval for development aid increases with educational 
level achieved. These results are contrary to Henson and Lindstrom’s findings (2012): they neither found 
an effect of education nor of gender, while age increased the likelihood to support cuts in development aid. 
The coefficient of left-right self-placement is highly significant, but moderately negative indicating that 
development aid becomes less important the more right one positions oneself on the 10 item scale.  
In model 2, the control variable GDP is added to the analysis. Its effect is marginal: it is almost 0 and 
lacks significance. Model 3 includes the Gini coefficients. A negative effect was expected. Surprisingly, an 
opposing effect is found: it is positive and significant on a very high level indicating that higher income 
inequality leads to the fact that people are more supportive regarding development aid.  
The next macro variable that is added to the model is ODA. Its coefficient is with .11 quite high, but it 
fails to be significant. One needs to keep in mind that a one unit increase in ODA as percentage of GNI 
would be a huge increase as the overall range observed across countries is between .08 % and 1.13%.  
Model 5 includes interaction terms for being rich or poor and inequality. Although the coefficients 
point into the expected direction, namely that high domestic inequalitydiminishes support for development 
among the poor, while it increase the rich’s support, they lack statistical significance.  
The last model includes micro and macro level predictors, year and country fixed effects. Hence, it 
implies a strict test of the income inequality effect as it merely tests the effect of inequality changes within 
countries over time which are mostly smaller than differences between countries. Due to parsimony, 
country fixed effects are not shown within the table. When controlling for country fixed effects, effects of 
income inequality diminish to zero. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Mixed models with random country-year-intercepts year fixed effects, individual 
and contextual predictors 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  
Income  0.01
*** 
 0.01
*** 
 0.00
*** 
 0.01
*** 
 0.00
* 
 0.00
* 
 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Female  0.10
*** 
 0.10
*** 
 0.10
*** 
 0.10
*** 
 0.10
*** 
 0.10
*** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Age  0.00
** 
 0.00
** 
 0.00
** 
 0.00
* 
 0.00  0.00  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
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Education Reference: up to age 15  
16-19  0.03
*** 
 0.03
*** 
 0.04
*** 
 0.04
*** 
 0.04
*** 
 0.04
*** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
20 years or 
older 
0.18
*** 
 0.18
*** 
 0.18
*** 
 0.19
*** 
 0.19
*** 
 0.19
*** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
still 
studying 
0.26
*** 
 0.26
*** 
 0.26
*** 
 0.27
*** 
 0.27
*** 
 0.27
*** 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
Left-Right  -0.04
*** 
 -0.04
*** 
 -0.04
*** 
 -0.04
*** 
 -0.04
*** 
 -0.04
*** 
 
Placement  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Year of Reference: 1983  
1987  0.16
* 
 0.18
* 
 0.15
* 
 0.14  0.14  0.12  
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)  
1991  0.28
*** 
 0.33
*** 
 0.26
*** 
 0.22
** 
 0.22
** 
 0.23
** 
 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  
1995  0.14  0.21
* 
 0.12  0.08  0.09  0.10  
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  
1996  0.32
*** 
 0.39
*** 
 0.29
*** 
 0.27
*** 
 0.27
*** 
 0.27
* 
 
 (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.12)  
1998  0.16
* 
 0.24
** 
 0.12  0.10  0.10  0.11  
 (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.14)  
2002  0.50
*** 
 0.61
*** 
 0.45
*** 
 0.42
*** 
 0.42
*** 
 0.44
** 
 
 (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.17)  
GDP   -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Gini   0.02
*** 
 0.02
*** 
 0.02
*** 
 0.00  
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
ODA  0.11  0.12  0.05  
 (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.20)  
Poor*Gini  -0.03  -0.03  
  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Rich*Gini  0.01  0.01  
  (0.04)  (0.04)  
Constant  2.91
*** 
 2.98
*** 
 2.35
*** 
 2.22
*** 
 2.22
*** 
 2.64
*** 
 
 (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.17)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.23)  
Log lik.  -70763.42  -70761.77  -70754.14  -67485.88  -66400.36  -66365.54  
Chi2 Value  2483.92 (0.00)  2259.16 (0.00)  2039.47 (0.00)  1858.32 (0.00)  1853.97 (0.00)  819.52 (0.00)  
Rho  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.02  
N (N groups)  62184 (95)  62184 (95)  62184 (95)  59526 (91)  58672 (90)  58672 (90)  
Standard errors in parentheses 
* 
p < 0.05, 
** 
p < 0.01, 
*** 
p < 0.001 
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Conclusion 
The analysis’ aim was to explain variation in support for development aid by countries’ income 
inequality level, prosperity and development aid generosity. Although there is variation between countries 
concerning approval of development aid, the analysis did not confirm the main focus of this article, namely 
that there is a negative relationship between income inequality and people’s approval for development aid. 
Rather, the exact opposite was shown, namely that income inequality positively spurs people’s support for 
development aid. Further, although lacking statistical significance, it was found that a country’s level of 
Official Development Assistance was positively related to people’s attitude. Yet, interaction terms of the 
lower and upper income quartile and Gini failed to be significant, indicating that income inequality does 
not spur the effects of income at the upper and lower tail of the income distribution on support for 
development aid.  
It is a pivotal finding that ODA fails to be significant. Although no causal claim about the relationship 
between ODA and people’s approval of development aid has been made, it was expected that a 
significantly positive association between those two variables would be found. The coefficients had the 
expected direction, but they were not significant which might be explained with reference to the fact that 
Gini and ODA are highly collinear. Prospective research might consider including an index instead, for 
example for general welfare generosity or government size.  
The analysis shows that macro attributes do not seem to strongly spur people’s stance. This is not 
consistent with earlier research findings: Paxton and Knack (2008) found that both wealth and actual 
development aid size shaped people’s attitudes towards development aid. In contrast to the hypothesis 
developed in this article, it was shown that people living in countries that have a high level of ODA 
indicate lower support for increasing aid. However, their research design included neither country fixed 
effects nor longitudinal data.  
It was found that support for development aid is shaped by socioeconomic characteristics like income 
and education. Both educational level and household income significantly increases the support for 
development aid, even though the impact of educational level ismuch stronger. Concerning demographic 
characteristics, it seems that the impact of age is marginal, while women perceive development aid as more 
pivotal than men. Further, political right self-placement is related to lower concern regarding development 
aid.  
Yet, prospective research should consider whether country specific value orientations or norms can be 
the explanatory variable for between country differences in approval of development aid. It was not 
possible to explicitly test value orientations within this analysis. A fine-grained analysis is needed to 
measure and differentiate the effects of values like solidarity, altruism, philanthropy or egalitarian ideals. 
Furthermore, due to data set limitations, religious affiliation was not included in the analysis, but it has 
been found that it is one of the main impacts (Paxton & Knack 2008).  
Other limitations of the analysis are reliability issues due to survey design. Although the 
Eurobarometer surveys are a very rich and reliable data source, it should be pointed to the fact that the 
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survey question setup changed between the analyzed time points: both question order and other topics 
addressed within the questionnaire varied, so wave variations might be partly owing to survey design.  
The high values for support of development aid suggest that data validity is also constrained by 
socially desirable answering behavior. Nobody wants to confess that one considers development aid as 
something marginal if one is asked about. Yet, using data of the British Elections Study, Hudson and van 
Heerde-Hudson (2012) found that hardly any respondent mentioned global poverty as a main concern when 
asked as an open question. Aiming to measure approval of development aid in a relative way, Henson and 
Lindstrom (2012) found that two third of all respondents indicated that development aid should be rather 
decreased when respondents were asked about governmental priorities. On the other hand, it is doubtful 
whether this upward bias in answering behavior varies systematically between countries or other groups. In 
addition, respondents may wrongly confound development aid with humanitarian aid which is due to the 
vagueness of the survey question (see also Henson & Lindstrom 2012).  
Further, it was not possible to explicitly test Noël and Thérien’s argument that support for domestic 
redistribution negatively impairs support for international redistribution. Hence, disentangling the exact 
association between domestic inequality, redistribution and people’s support for development aid remains a 
task for the future.  
Within this data analysis, the concept support development aid was treated as a continuous variable. 
Yet, with solely four categories, it is strictly speaking an ordinal variable where ordinal logit models would 
be more adequate. Finally, it might be expedient to rerun the analysis with lagged structural variables in 
order to exclude country prosperity, official development assistance and income inequality as predictors. 
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Information on the GINI project 
Aims	  
The core objective of GINI is to deliver important new answers to questions of great interest to European societies: 
What are the social, cultural and political impacts that increasing inequalities in income, wealth and education may 
have? For the answers, GINI combines an interdisciplinary analysis that draws on economics, sociology, political 
science and health studies, with improved methodologies, uniform measurement, wide country coverage, a clear 
policy dimension and broad dissemination. 
Methodologically, GINI aims to: 
  exploit differences between and within 29 countries in inequality levels and trends for understanding the impacts 
and teasing out implications for policy and institutions, 
  elaborate on the effects of both individual distributional positions and aggregate inequalities, and 
  allow for feedback from impacts to inequality in a two-way causality approach. 
The project operates in a framework of policy-oriented debate and international comparisons across all EU countries 
(except Cyprus and Malta), the USA, Japan, Canada and Australia. 
Inequality	  Impacts	  and	  Analysis	  
Social impacts of inequality include educational access and achievement, individual employment opportunities and 
labour market behaviour, household joblessness, living standards and deprivation, family and household formation/ 
breakdown, housing and intergenerational social mobility, individual health and life expectancy, and social cohesion 
versus polarisation. Underlying long-term trends, the economic cycle and the current financial and economic crisis 
will be incorporated. Politico-cultural impacts investigated are: Do increasing income/educational inequalities widen 
cultural and political ‘distances’, alienating people from politics, globalisation and European integration? Do they 
affect individuals’ participation and general social trust? Is acceptance of inequality and policies of redistribution 
affected by inequality itself? What effects do political systems (coalitions/winner-takes-all) have? Finally, it focuses 
on costs and benefi ts of policies limiting income inequality and its effi ciency for mitigating other inequalities 
(health, housing, education and opportunity), and addresses the question what contributions policy making itself may 
have made to the growth of inequalities. 
Support	  and	  Activities	  
The project receives EU research support to the amount of Euro 2.7 million. The work will result in four main reports 
and a fi nal report, some 70 discussion papers and 29 country reports. The start of the project is 1 February 2010 for a 
three-year period. Detailed information can be found on the website. 
www.gini-­‐research.org	  

	  	  
	  
